Due to the large size of the training data, distributed learning approaches such as federated learning have gained attention recently. However, the convergence rate of distributed learning suffers from heterogeneous worker performance. In this letter, we consider an incentive mechanism for workers to mitigate the delays in completion of each batch. We analytically obtained equilibrium solution of a Stackelberg game. Our numerical results indicate that with a limited budget, the model owner should judiciously decide on the number of workers due to trade off between the diversity provided by the number of workers and the latency of completing the training.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE RECENT success of deep learning approaches for domains such as speech recognition and computer vision stems from many algorithmic improvements but also from the fact that the size of available training data has grown significantly over the years, together with the computing power. The current trend is to use a larger data set and to train deeper networks (higher number of layers) to improve the accuracy. However, the complexity and the memory requirements quickly become unmanageable within the resources of a single machine. An efficient way to deal with this colossal computing task within a reasonable training time is to adopt distributed computation, and to exploit computation and memory resources of multiple machines in parallel. In [1] , the Federated Learning (FL) protocol was introduced to allow the mobile devices perform computation of model training locally on their training data according to the model released by the model owner. Such a design enables mobile users to collaboratively learn a shared prediction model while keeping all the training data private on the device.
Most of the popular distributed training algorithms include mini-batch versions of stochastic gradient descent (SGD). Unfortunately, fully-synchronous implementations of stochastic optimization are often slow in practice due to the need to wait for the slowest machine in each synchronous batch, i.e., they suffer from the so called straggler effect. For example, experiments on Amazon EC2 instances show that some workers can be five times slower than the typical performance [2] . There have been several attempts in the literature to mitigate the straggler effect by adding redundancy to the distributed computing system via coding [3] , [4] computation tasks [5] , [6] . However, these works overlooked the inherent heterogeneity in the computing capacity of different workers. It is crucial to consider the implications of such heterogeneity on optimizing the task allocation to different workers, improving learning accuracy, minimizing latency, and/or minimizing energy consumption. In that sense, [7] considers the problem of adaptive task allocation with the aim to maximize the learning accuracy, while satisfying a delay constraint resulting from data distribution/aggregation over heterogeneous channels, and local computation on heterogeneous nodes. Furthermore, the limited computing resource of a user device is shared among all running applications. The independent and rational mobile clients need an incentive to participate in federated learning. Hence, a critical question that needs to be addressed by each worker is "How much Central Processor Unit (CPU) resource of heterogeneous workers should be allocated to the training task of the model owner?" The answer to this question has repercussions for the central model owner, since in its most basic form of fullysynchronous SGD, the model owner has to wait for the gradients from all workers in order to update its current set of model parameters.
In [8] , a game theoretical approach is established to consider a communication incentive in federated learning, where the aim was to construct a relay network and cooperative communications for supporting model update transfer. Our main contribution in this letter, is the introduction of an incentive mechanism in FL protocol to improve its efficiency by optimizing the power allocation across workers instead of treating all workers equally. In this setting, at each gradient update step, the model owner offers an incentive to each worker participating in the federated learning process. Based on this incentive, the workers determine the CPU power they will use to calculate their gradient from the local data. The model owner has a finite budget and distributes its budget among its workers to achieve a fast convergence to a target error rate. We model the interaction between the mobile devices and the model owner as a Stackelberg game. In Stackelberg game, the model owner is the buyer as it buys the learning service provided by the mobile devices. Then, the mobile devices that are the service providers act as the sellers. The model owner inherently acts as the single leader in the upper level of the Stackelberg game while the mobile devices are the corresponding followers. We obtained the equilibrium solution of this game by first quantifying the average time required to finish a single iteration of SGD. We implement our game theoretical algorithm numerically on MNIST dataset to demonstrate the effects of the number of workers employed and budget of the model owner on the overall latency.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a cooperative federated learning system as shown in Figure 1 . Specifically, a model owner employs a set of mobile devices, i.e., workers to train a high-quality 2576-3156 c 2019 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. centralized model. The workers fetch the current parameters w i from the model owner as and when instructed in the algorithm. Then, they compute gradients using one mini-batch and push their gradients back to the model owner. At each iteration, the model owner aggregates the gradients computed by the workers and updates the parameter w.
Let T i,t be the time elapsed for the worker i to update the gradient in iteration t. Here, we consider plain fullysynchronous SGD such that the model owner waits for all the workers to push their gradients. Thus, iteration t is completed in max i T i,t time, i.e., when all workers send their gradient updates. We assume that the time taken by worker i to compute gradient of one mini-batch is random and independently distributed across mini-batches and workers [9] . Specifically, we assume that T i,t is exponentially distributed with mean P i c i , where c i denotes the total number of CPU cycles required to accomplish the computation task, and P i denotes CPU power, i.e., the computation ability represented as CPU cycles per second of worker i.
The model owner negotiates with the workers about the CPU power, i.e., P i . In return, each worker i = 1, . . . , K will receive the revenue q i P i from the model owner, where q i is the price of one unit of worker i's CPU power. Intuitively, the latency required to finish the learning process depends on the total usage of CPU power of all workers. Specifically, the learning latency becomes smaller as the expected value of maximum of T i,t reduces. As a result, the model owner aims to minimize the following cost function:
Note that E[ max i T i,t ] decreases with increasing value of P i . Let B denote the maximum allowable budget of the model owner to pay for CPU power usage of cooperative workers. Lemma 1: The expected value of the time required to finish a single iteration is obtained as:
where the sum is over all non-empty subsets S of {1, 2, . . . , K } and |S | denotes the number of elements of S. In addition,
Note that our objective is to minimize the average time to finish a single iteration by optimizing the computation powers of the given number of workers subject to a fixed budget of the model owner. Hence, the number of iterations required to reach the target error will not be improved by our scheme.
Proof: We omit the proof, since it follows the same lines of derivation of [10, Proposition 3.2].
Note that while worker i obtains a revenue of q i P i from the model owner, it also has an energy cost incurred due to the computation of learning task. The energy cost depends on the value of CPU power used, P i , as κc i (P i ) 2 , where κ is a coefficient depending on the chip architecture [11] . Thus, each worker i aims to maximize the following utility function:
subject to P i ≤ P max , where P max is the maximum available CPU power of the worker.
III. STACKELBERG GAME AND EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTION
In this section, we model the interaction between the workers and the model owner as a Stackelberg game. In the lower level of the game, the workers determine their CPU power, P i , as a function of price per unit, q i , and they truthfully report their respected solutions to the model owner. In the upper level, the model owner decides on the price per unit CPU power for each worker, q i . As a result, the Stackelberg game can be formally defined as follows:
1) Lower-level Subgame: Given the fixed vector of prices of one unit of CPU power q = q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q K , the lower-level subgame problem is defined as:
where P max is the maximum available CPU power.
2) Upper-level Subgame: After each worker's CPU power utilization is determined with respect to the prices, the model owner forms a upper-level subgame problem as follows:
where B is the available budget of the model owner.
Based on the game formulation, we consider a Stackelberg equilibrium to the solution for the model owner and the workers. Specifically, by following the backward induction, we firstly use the first-order optimality condition to obtain the equilibrium solution to the lower level subgame. Then, we substitute the Nash equilibrium of the lower-level subgame into the upper-level subgame and investigate the solution to the upper-level subgame.
A. Solution to Lower-Level Subgame
To find the equilibrium solution for the lower-level subgame at each worker, we take the first derivative of the utility function of each worker in (3) with respect to P i : By equating (8) to zero, we obtain the equilibrium CPU power as:
Furthermore, it is easy to show that the utility function of each worker is strictly concave, which guarantees the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium.
B. Solution to Upper-Level Subgame
After obtaining the equilibrium CPU power of each worker as a function of price per unit CPU power, we investigate the solution to the upper-level subgame for the model owner. Due to the high non-linearity of the maximum time equation given in Lemma 1, we cannot obtain the closed form solution for the general case. Instead, we present Lemma 2 that can be used to develop an efficient update algorithm to reach the equilibrium point for the heterogeneous case, where c i = c j , ∀i , j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K }.
Lemma 2: The equilibrium solution is realized at the boundary, i.e., K i=1 (q * i ) 2 2κc i = B , where q * i is the equilibrium price per unit of CPU power of worker i.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A.
The closed-form solution to the homogeneous case where c i = c j , ∀i , j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K } is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: When c i = c j = c, ∀i , j ∈ 1, 2, . . . , K , the equilibrium solution to the upper-level subgame is q * i = 2B κc K , for all i. Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In the simulations, we use MNIST dataset for which we first convert the 28 x 28 images into single vectors of length 784. We use a single layer of neurons followed by soft-max cross entropy with logits loss function. Thus, effectively the parameters consist of a weight matrix W of size 784 x 10 and a bias vector b of size 1 x 10. We use a regularizer of value 0.01, and learning rate of value 0.05. Furthermore, maximum CPU power of a single worker, P max is selected as 5 · 10 8 cycles per second. For implementation we used Tensorflow with Python3. For the run-time simulations, we generate random variables from the respective distributions in Python to represent the computation times. Specifically, the computation time for each worker is generated from an exponential distribution with mean P i c i . Furthermore, to consider heterogeneous workers in the system, we select c i uniformly randomly in the range of [0.5 · 10 3 , 1.5 · 10 3 ]. Due to the randomness of the selection of c i and randomness of stochastic gradient descent (SGD), we run each realization 50 times and take the average. In the simulations, we are interested in the error rate defined as the ratio of the difference between the processed image and the original image with the original image. The simulations end when a target error rate is realized, and the time elapsed to reach this target error rate is recorded.
For a given number of workers, there is one-to-one mapping between the number of iterations and the corresponding wallclock delay. In Fig. 2 , we illustrate the relationship for the case when the budget, B, is equal to 10. As seen in Fig. 2a , the number of iterations decreases with increasing number workers due to the effect of increasing diversity gain. On the other hand, as seen in Fig. 2b , the average time required to complete an iteration increases with increasing number of workers, since the model owner has to wait for all workers to finish their corresponding iterations.
Next, we investigate the effect of varying the number of workers and the budget on the latency to reach a target error rate in Fig. 3a and 3b . Note that for every value of the budget, the latency initially decreases with the number of workers, since the error improves with increasing K. This is because, a higher number of workers in the training leads to an increase in diversity, and thus, the system requires fewer iterations to reach the target error rate. However, after a certain point, the latency to reach the target error rate begins to increase, because now each iteration takes a longer period of time to complete due to the waiting for an update from all workers. Hence, beyond a certain number of workers, the delay per iteration exceeds the positive effect of the reduction in the number of iteration.
Also observe that the time required to reach the target error rate decreases, as the budget of the model owner increases. This is because an increase in the budget results in more CPU Fig. 3a demonstrates the trade-off between the diversity, which leads to reduction in total number of iterations, and the time elapsed to complete each iteration, both of which increases with the number of workers. Henceforth, for a given budget and target error rate, there exists an optimal number of workers that should be employed by the model owner.
Finally, we investigate the optimal number of workers minimizing the total latency for varying budget and target error rates. As depicted in Fig. 3b , an increase in the budget leads to an increase in the optimal number of workers, since as the budget increases, more CPU power can be purchased from more workers. Furthermore, as target error rate decreases, the optimal number of workers increases. This is because as the target error rate decreases, the number of iterations to complete the process increases, which in turn allows the diversity of training data provided by different workers to become more effective.
V. CONCLUSION In this letter, we have presented a Stackelberg game model to analyze the CPU allocation strategies of multiple workers as well as the budget allocation of the model owner in a fully-synchronous SGD. Note that apart from a few recent works, the literature on FL almost entirely treat workers identically, where it is assumed that the workers dedicate all of their resources to the computational task of model worker. Clearly, with workers being individual (selfish) devices such as smartphones, this is not a valid assumption. These devices perform the learning task along with several other ongoing tasks; and thus, their limited computational resource should be shared among these tasks. This letter is one of the first in FL, which introduces a mechanism for the model owner to distribute incentives to the participating workers in order to improve the convergence time of the learning task. Specifically, we have investigated the impact of the available budget and target error rate of the model owner on the CPU power utilization of the workers and the overall convergence time of the learning process. Our results demonstrate the importance of an efficient resource allocation in a practical learning system with non-altruistic workers.
One important direction of extension of this letter is to consider a dynamic game formulation that arises when the dynamic channel and worker CPU conditions are taken into account. Additionally, the interactions between the model owner and workers depend on the learning approach implemented, e.g., AdaGrad, ADAM, etc. Although similar tradeoffs exist regardless of the method implemented, it would be insightful to study the optimal number of workers depending on the method used.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 2
We first substitute the optimal CPU power allocations for the workers, i.e., P * i , given as in (9) into the cost minimization problem given in (6)- (7) . As the constraint in (7) is linear, we adopt the Lagrangian method. The Lagrangian function for the optimization problem (6)-(7) is given as follows:
where L(·) is Lagrangian function and α denotes Lagrangian multiplier.
To obtain the optimal solution, we take the first derivative of Lagrangian function with respect to q i .
∂L(q , α) ∂q
In (11), we use the relation between λ i and q i , i.e., λ i = q i 2κc 2 i . Then, we equate the first derivative given in (11) to zero to derive the value of Lagrange multiplier, α, at the optimal point as:
Similarly, from the second and third Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions we have α( K i=1 q 2 i 2κc i −B ) = 0 and α ≥ 0. Thus, the first term in (12) should be positive. Intuitively, as the exponential parameter, i.e., the inverse of mean completion time, λ i , increases, the maximum value of completion times should decrease. As a result, we can guarantee that α is positive. Thus, from complementary slackness condition of KKT, the solution exists at the boundary.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Using the result given in (12) and the fact that c i = c j = c, ∀i , j , we obtain the following relation: 
A trivial solution to (13) is achieved when λ i = λ j = λ, ∀i , j ∈ 1, 2, . . . , K . This will also result in equal value of q i 's. Combining this result and the result given in Lemma 2, we obtain:
